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THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 
SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
The forty-second annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical 
Association was held Saturday, April 8, 1972, at Columbia College, 
Columbia, South Carolina. Approximately 50 members and guests attended 
one or more of the programs. 
Following registration in the basement of Edens Library, the first session 
was called to order at 9:30 a. m. in that building, Association President 
Ronald D. Burnside presiding. Professor Robert J. Moore, Columbia College, 
brought greetings from President R. Wright Spears who was out of the city. 
The first paper read was "Reformist and Humanitarian Criticism of British 
Imperialism, 1878-1882," by John V. Crangle, Allen University, which was 
discussed by A. O. Njoku, Benedict College. John M. Block, Furman 
University, then read a paper entitled "British Press and Public Reaction to 
Prussian Policy, 1854-1866" which was discussed by Joseph Wightman, 
Erskine College. The morning session adjourned at 11:45 and was followed 
immediately by a meeting of the Executive Committee. 
Luncheon was served in Humphries Hall at 12:30 p. m., after which the 
annual business meeting was held. The minutes of the forty-first meeting were 
approved as printed in the PROCEEDINGS, and the Treasurer's report, 
copies of which were distributed to all members present, was adopted. 
Miss Wylma Wates, for the Executive Committee, presented the 
following slate of officers for 1972-1973: 
President: J. M. Lesesne, Jr., Wofford College 
Vice President: C. W. Bolen, Clemson University 
Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College 
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1975): E. T. Crowson, 
Winthrop College 
There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the s late 
be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. President Burnside 
announced that Dr. Ware had agreed to serve as Editor of the 
PROCEEDINGS for one more year but that both he and Dr. Gannaway had 
asked to be relieved of their duties in 1973. 
A motion was made and seconded that the constitutional amendment 
distributed to all members at the beginning of the business meeting be 
approved. The amendment was that (1) the present Article VIII shall be 
designated Article IX, and that (2) a new Article VIII shall be inserted to 
read: "In the event of dissolution, the remaining assets of the Association, if 
any, shall be donated to another organization which also enjoys tax-exempt 
status under Section 501-C-3 of the Internal Revenue Code." Dr. Gannaway 
explained that the amendment was necessary if the Association expected its 
application for tax-exempt status to be approved. The motion was carried 
unanimously. 
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President Burnside announced that no decision had been made 
concerning the date and location of the forty-third annual meeting but that 
this information would be sent to members later. He then thanked Columbia 
College for its hospitality and commended Professor Moore for the splendid 
work don e by his local arrangements committee. 
The afternoon session, again held in Edens Library, began at 2:00 p. m. 
Papers read were "William Howard Taft and the Republican Party in So uth 
Carolina" by David C. Needham, Presbyterian College, discussed by 
Theodore Hemmingway, Benedict College; and "Olin D. Johnston and the 
Highway Department Controversy" by Jay Bender, St. Andrews Presbyterian 
College, discussed by Marvin Cann, Lander College. Audience participation 
was enthusiastic before the session ended at 4:15 p. m. 
Preceded by a social hour in the Student Center Lounge, the Banquet 
Session was convened in Humphries Hall at 7:00 p. m. Following dinner, Dr. 
Seth Tillman, Chief Counsel for the United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, read a paper on and led a lively discussion of the subject 
"The History of the Development of War Powers in American Government." 
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 9:15 p. 
m. 
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BRITISH PRESS AND PUBLIC REACTION 
TO PRUSSIAN POLICY, 1854-1866 
John M. Block 
As Werner Eugen Mosse has pointed out in his excellent work, The 
European Powers and the German Question 1848-1871, the emergence of a 
strong Prussianized Germany has too often been examined in a purely 
Prussian light. Certainly Bismarck was the equal of any nineteenth century 
diplomat and made brilliant use of the opportunities available to him. Yet no 
individual or group of men could have transformed the weakest of the five 
great powers to the strongest in just a few short years if the international 
situation had not favored such a change. 
In particular, English policy historically had been zealously aimed at 
preventing the growth of a disproportionately powerful force on the continent. 
Yet Whitehall took no steps to prevent Bismarck's reshaping of central 
Europe. Among a number of factors that precipitated this lack of action was 
the fact that the British desired a strong Germany to counter Russian "Asiatic 
Barbarism" and to check the dangerous "ambitions and intrigues" of 
Napoleon III. Throughout the dozen years following the outbreak of the 
Crimean War, years in which momentous changes in the European power 
structure were occurring, the British expressed consistent great expectations 
towards the events and inhabitants of central Europe. The Germans were 
after all primarily protestant, racially akin to the British and shortly destined 
to achieve liberal government — in short to become the Britain of the 
continent. 
Considering the state of development of public organs and their impact 
on the government structures of the European nations of the mid-nineteenth 
century, it seems strange that English popular opinion has been the most 
neglected. While E. M. Caroll and Lynn Case have examined various phases 
of French and German opinion in the nineteenth century, and Oron J . Hale 
has dealt with both England and Germany at the turn of the century; there is 
next to nothing dealing with British opinion in the age of realpolitik, and 
public opinion in regard to Prussia and Germany has been completely 
neglected. It is the purpose of this paper to examine public opinion in Britain 
during the Seven Weeks War and illustrate some of the prevalent attitudes of 
the previous twelve years, in particular to demonstrate that British opinion 
was favorable to German unification and was willing to overlook the 
unpopular means to this desired end 
Despite a continued patient optimism, by 1866 the British were 
temporarily piqued by the course of events in Germany. Bismarck's high 
handed actions toward the Prussian Landtag and Denmark were definitely 
inconsistent with the British blueprint for central Europe. Not only had the 
Prussian's perverted their designated role in Europe, but as a result of their 
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arrogant behavior toward the Danes and their demonstration of British 
weakness had humiliated the British. Furthermore many observers feared 
that Prussia might be willing to "do a deal" with Napoleon III, trading the 
Rhineland for French neutrality in the approaching war. 
While the British did not welcome this war they wished to take no active 
part in safeguarding the peace and expressed no inclination to take part in an 
international conference. Only the Daily Telegraph called for a conference on 
the frivolous grounds that after the war one would be required anyway and it 
might as well be held without the fighting. The memory of the failures of 1864 
was too near. While most speakers and publications believed conferences and 
congressed were ineffectual, Granville, Lord President of the Council, felt that 
"the gathering together of such intriguers as the Enperor, Gortchakoff, and 
Bismarck" was absolutely dangerous and "in itself an evil."1 When Austria 
torpedoed the proposed conference, therefore, the British were not distressed, 
though as Gladstone told Commons, war was inevitable.2 His pessimism was 
well-grounded. On 1 6 June the Prussians crossed into Hanover and two days 
later the formal declarations of war were delivered. 3 
Fleet Street did not restrain itself from spe culation about the momentous 
developments that could result from this war in centr al Europe. Most papers, 
however, only implied that the war would be long and would involve other 
powers. The Manchester Guardian was among a small minority of 
publications that openly attempted to predict the character the war would 
take. To choose a victor between Austria and Prussia was difficult because 
war "would no sooner have begun than it would draw in domestic and foreign 
elements, neither the power nor the direction of which can be reckoned with 
precision." It appeared that the well-matched German powers would engage 
in "a long combat with a doubtful issue," a war whose end could not be 
foreseen. 
Hostilities were the extension of the diplomatic struggle that had been 
progressing since Denmark's defeat. In war as in diplomacy, the antagonists 
were vying for the virtual sovereignty of Germany. The Guardian, moreover, 
cautioned its readers not to be too disappointed or disapproving if the 
Prussians wholeheartedly supported Bismarck: "It is universal and within 
certain limits, it is right that populations should be for a time at least enlisted 
in favor of war . . ." Although the Prussians would support Bismarck for the 
time being, these naturally liberal people would "pretty certainly overthrow 
Count Bismarck's Government, together with some more august institutions 
at the end . . . ."4 
The Times deplored the idea of ci vil war in Germany. How could those 
"well-educated, intelligent, thrifty, industrious, and enterprising" Prussians 
incite this war? A war b etween Austria and Prussia would be "something 
more" than a civil war. "It would be like a war between Ohio and Illinois in 
contempt of the supreme Government at Washington." Yet in spite of these 
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views a nd the fact that to many Prussian policy seemed suicidal, the Times 
did not characterize Bismarck's policy as totally reckless. There was "literally 
no sacrifice which German Liberals might not be willing to make to the vision 
of German unity." On the other hand, should Bismarck fail, Germany would 
likely be more consolidated by Austria. In either case, the resultant Germany 
was bound to be more practical than the present organization. "If the events 
should prove that the Confederation is now a thing of the past, there may be 
no reason to regret the change."5 
The Daily News had always decried Prussian "preference for greatness 
over freedom." The latest developments only manifested that preference. For 
the last three years Prussia had shown itself to be "false and perfidious.' 
Berlin's ultimate aim was to "overthrow the political fabric of Germany, and 
destroy the only institution which has represented its national unity since the 
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire.6 
In further contrast to the opinion that any new organization of Germany 
would be an improvement, the Morning Post felt that no good result could 
come of an Austro-Prussian war. Even if Prussia could succeed against 
Austria and several other German states, which was doubtful, and could 
"swallow up the German Principalities, the Rhine must go to France, unless 
victor and vanquished combine to oppose it."7 
The Spectator, like the Manchester Guardian, openly predicted a 
non-decisive campaign between two "tolerably equal" forces. The hostilities 
would be "dubious, costly, and horribly murderous.' The Spectator, however, 
was able to discern possible momentous and even beneficial results coming 
from t he war, although this was by no means absolutely certain. Prussia s 
situation was understandable and "not entirely in the wrong. Perhaps the 
union of Northern Germany was worth a war, but the aggression of I ranee 
was a very real danger which had to be avoided.8 
The Standard could see no peace in Germany until Austria and Prussia 
had se ttled "the questions of pre-dominance in Germany. Although at first 
glance it seemed improbable, the war would be as popular in P russia as the 
War of Liberation. The sides were about even according to the conservative 
paper, and success or failure might well depend upon how well Austria s 
financial resources survived. As the Prussians poured in to Hanover, Saxony 
and Electoral Hesse, the Standard noted how advantageous their annexation 
to Prussia would be.9 
The Pall Mall Gazette did not dissent that the stakes were high in central 
Europe. Prussia's supremacy in Germany was Bismarck s goal, and, whatever 
the results of "the terrible catastrophe now coming over Prussia and 
Germany," there was no doubt that to Bismarck would belong forever the 
credit for having instigated it.'0 
The Economist had pointed out during the previous year the nuisance 
that the petty principalities of Germany had always been to Europe. If the 
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Hohenzollerns could absorb these states by some great success it would not 
only rid Europe of a continuous source of trouble but also make the victory of 
liberal and constitutional government more certain by reinforcing and 
reinvigorating the forces of liberalism within Prussia. Now the opportunity 
was at hand for Prussia to make Germany great, "indeed quite equal to 
France." 11 
The Saturday Review recoiled from the thought of a war between 
Germans but was forced to admit that it was probable. This war would be 
"great in its scale, and gravely momentous in its consequences." It was a 
struggle for national predominance. The real opportunity was Prussia's 
because at best Austria could only hope to preserve things as they were, but 
Prussia had "a splendid prize" before it. Bismarck was not the man "to See 
the prize floating before his eyes and fail to grasp it . . . ."12 
The weekly Guardian exemplified the bitterness and resentment that 
some British publications felt towards Bismarck. He had irritated and 
provoked the Austrians into a war which he hoped would turn national 
attention away from his internal transgressions. The "right and fitness of 
Prussia to be leader of Germany "was questionable when its people could be 
driven into war by a man who "only imitates great contrivers of war in selfish 
arrogance and cynical scorn of justice and the opinion of mankind."13 
Other publications, like Fortnightly Review decried the fact that 
Germany was entering a "fratricidal" war, and expected a long period of 
suffering. Only the Daily Telegraph broke the pattern and fearlessly predicted 
a rapid conclusion to.the war. Although Parliament had abstained from 
commenting on the coming conflagration it was not for lack of interest in "the 
affairs of our Teutonic kinsmen." Rather it was due to the fact that the British 
had nothing to fear in t he growth of either Austria or Prussia. While some 
observers and apparently the French Government expected a war in which the 
combattants would exhaust each other, the Telegraph judged that it was 
"certain" the war would be bloody and ruinous but short. "We shall never 
have long wars again." The advanced state of human slaughter had made 
sustained war impossible.14 
Initial military maneuvers were followed with interest in England, and by 
late June a crucial and decisive battle was expected. Prussia's initiative and 
success had been impressive, and its army had shown resolution, preparation 
and an insensibility to scruples. Austrian slowness, on the other hand, enabled 
its enemies to make immediate gains. Whether these gains would be 
permanent or not, their political impact would be great in Germany. Few were 
ready, however, to concede victory to Prussia, and even fewer were as certain 
as the Spectator that the work of unifying North Germany had been done for 
the Liberals by their erstwhile enemy. The British still expected Napoleon III 
to become arbiter of Europe in return for fitting compensation. Most 
observers, moreover, believed that Austria had a not inconsequential 
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advantage in the person of General Benedek, and they expected his role to be 
crucial. This it was, though his role as vanquished rather than victor was not 
commonly foreseen.15 
No one in Britain, however, was prepared for the swiftness with which 
the future of Germany was decided. The news of the Prussian victory at 
Konnigratz on 3 July shocked the British. The Manchester Guardian 
expressed its amazement: "We have scarcely settled in our seats and 
concentrated our attention to see the play, before the action shows signs of 
exhaustion, and the end of the plot appears to be in v iew."16 
It was immediately and widely accepted that the consequences of the 
Prussian victory would be immense. There was a complete change of attitu de 
toward Prussia, its army and its Chief Minister. The British viewed 
Hohenzollern success with awe. Macmillan 's Magazine expressed the view 
that whenever a new compilation of the ' Decisive Battles of the World' would 
be published, "Sadowa or Konnigratz will have to be added to the list." The 
British would also have to revise their atti tude toward Ger many, which they 
would never be able to understand unless they freed themselves from "the 
stereotyped impression" that the Germans were "dreamers, enthusiasts, and 
sentimentalists." 17 
While Bismarck was the recipient of a favorable revision of opinion, the 
change was no greater than that regarding the efficiency of the Prussian 
Army. N o aspect of Prussian victory was more discussed than the army's 
breech-loading rifle, the needle gun, with which the entire Prussian infantry 
had been armed. Breech-loaders had been experimented with in one form or 
another for centuries, but the problem had been to construct a movable 
breech that could withstand the force of the explosion that propelled the shot. 
As early as 1835 Nikolaus von Dreyse had invented the ancestor of the rifle 
used at Konnigratz. By 1841 Prussia made its first order for the weapon, and 
it had been used in 1849 and 1864. By 1866 even Landwehr units were being 
supplied with the needle gun, but it was not until Konnigratz that its existence 
received widespread attention.18 
Some British publications gave nearly sole credit for Prussian success to 
this weapon. The Standard evaluated Prussia's early movements: "In 
defiance of strategy, but with confidence in the needle gun, the Prussians have 
attacked the Austrians in their chosen stronghold." This attack convinced the 
Standard that an important weapon had appeared which would alter the 
future course of warfare. The needle gun had "fully established its 
unquestionable superiority over all other implements of war.' Without 
disparaging the bravery of Prussian troops or the military authorities who had 
the good sense to adopt the new weapon, Prussia's victories were, nonetheless, 
primarily due to the new rifle. At Konnigratz for every three Prussian soldiers 
slain, at least eighteen Austrians were said to have shared their fate, a 
proportion exactly equivalent to the computed length of time within which the 
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needle breech loader can be discharged — six times for the one the capped 
breech loader can be fired." It was only as an afterthought that the Standard 
acknowledged that Bismarck, "the greatest if the wickedest statesman" of the 
generation, and the excellent organization and administration of the Prussian 
army had also played their part in making Prussian dominance possible, a 
situation that the Standard viewed as a "decided gain" from the British point 
t  •  19  oi view. 
The Prussians had boldly and skillfully planned their invasion according 
to the Pall Mall Gazette, but there was no doubt that the breech-loaders had 
"everywhere done the work." The Daily News reported the terrible effect of 
the rifle and repeated the claim by "a military correspondent" that "the 
Austrians who fell under fire of infantry were, compared to the Prussians, six 
to one." To the Morning Post it was evident "that the possession of a 
breech-loading gun gives the Prussians an advantage which renders all the 
courage and heroism of the adversaries utterly useless." It was this knowledge 
that had encouraged Bismarck to "brave the anger of all Germany." Without 
denigrating the Prussian military, the Spectator also acknowledged the 
effectiveness of Dreyse's weapon. The Telegraph, however, was overwhelmed. 
"In the moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the breech-loading needle gun . . . 
has rendered Prussia almost the umpire Power of Europe." With such a 
superb weapon, Bismarck could not only dictate terms to Austria, but also 
"defy the interference either of France or Russia." The Telegraph could only 
be grateful that Britain had not met the Prussians in combat two years before. 
Such an "accident" could have "pointed a moral similar to that which Austria 
is pointing today." Punch was so impressed, it offered a composition to be 
sung to the tune of 'The Dog Meat Man': 
Sharp shoots the Prussian Rifle, which 
Has to be loaded at the breech; 
Five times for each mouth-loader's one: 
What a formidable weapon is the needle gun! 
Oh, that unerring needle-gun! 
It does knock over men like fun. 
What a formidable weapon is the needle gun!20 
Others were somewhat more restrained. The Examiner reported that 
Dreyse, now an old man of seventy-eight, felt the gun could be improved, and 
that he could reduce the weight of a new model by three and a half pounds: 
"It has not killed and wounded enough to come to his expectations, but he 
hopes to do better." Cornhill Magazine reminded its readers that 
breech-loaders had always had their advocates. Admittedly the weapon 
possessed rapidity of fire, increased its user's confidence, was easier to load, 
improved shooting, avoided overloading, had compact ammunition, and was 
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easy to clean and inspect. Its rapidity and ease in firing, however, encouraged 
waste and made it difficult to keep the troops supplied.21 
Although the Times called Dreyse's weapon "the dread needle gun," it 
denied the result of Konnigratz was due to a "merely mechanical advantage." 
Certainly it had added to the effectiveness of the Prussians, but "the spirit of 
their onset, and the skillful arrangement by which a part of their army was 
brought on the flank and rear of the enemy would have effectually dislodged 
the Austrians from their position." Fraser's Magazine believed the Prussians 
deserved credit for using a superior weapon, but credited their success to the 
"intellectual superiority, more accurate information, and sounder judgment of 
King William and Count Bismarck." The Manchester Guardian agreed that 
there was more to Prussian success than the needle gun. It had not been an 
unknown quantity three weeks before, having been used in Denmark. 
Fortnightly Review asked if the rifle had caused "every Prussian Corp to 
arrive punctually to the minute at the place to which it had been ordered by 
telegraph from the central office at Berlin?" Had it been the needle gun that 
"made the Prussian soldier, even in Bohemia, in the midst of a hostile 
population and far from the headquarters of its resources, far better cared for 
than th e Austrians in their own country?"22 
The weekly Guardian had been very critical of Prussian policy but now 
could no longer restrain itself from running over with compliments. There had 
been few things in history more striking than the "vigor and ability' with 
which the Prussian Government had waged this war. The victory, "one of the 
greatest in the history of the world," should give Bismarck the name he was 
"notoriously ambitious of" and cover his generals with glory. The Guardian, 
as did all those commenting on the war, placed great importance on the 
Prussian breech-loader, but refused to credit the weapon alone for the 
Prussian victory. The gun was a great advantage, but "in generalship, in 
courage, in endurance, and in national spirit, the army of Prussia is superior 
to that of her former rival." 23 
The Economist believed that the needle gun had m ade Prussia not only 
the stronger of the two belligerents but "the strongest power in Europe. 
Although making allowances for "the audacity of that underestimated person, 
Count von Bismarck, for the splendid organization of the Prussian army, for 
the genius of Count von Molke . . . , th e result of the campaign is still mainly 
due to the Prussian possession of the needle gun." The advantages of the 
needle gun were enhanced, however, by Prussia's possession of Count 
Bismarck, who by exhibiting the quality necessary for greatness, "a political 
dreaming power with a thoroughly physical estimate of the instruments by 
which his dreams are to be realized," deserved to rank with Cavour and 
Napoleon III as one of Europe's great statesmen.24 
The usually sober Spectator was no less enthralled. Thirty dynasties had 
been "swept away," the fate of twenty million people had been affected 
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forever." The "political force of the world" had changed "as it used to change 
after a generation of war, and the strife has lasted but ten days." In a moment 
Prussia had leaped "into the position of the first Power in Europe." A year 
before North Germany was a prize the Prussians regarded as beyond hope, 
now it was an accomplished fact. Prussia had revealed to the world that "in 
the last resort, when Diets are powerless and diplomacy is sulkily quiet, the 
physical power of Prussia is equal to that of her great rival." 25 
The "audacious" Bismarck was "beyond all question the foremost man 
in E uropean politics." His career, moreover, had just begun and politicians 
had better ascertain what his "views and capacities" really were. Certainly the 
popular view had been distorted and incomplete. He as no "mere squire." The 
Spectator compared him to the patricians of Rome, who had combined a 
"strong will, great perseverence, and the highest astuteness with a kind of 
jovial recklessness." And of course, unlike the Roman patricians, Bismarck 
had the needle gun. The Spectator foresaw the unification of all Germany 
excluding Austria, and believed it would be "the formation of a great and 
progressive empire, with a free and noble national life." Napoleon III would 
be compelled to decide if he would allow this and lose his prestige as "the 
arbiter of Europe" or to risk defeat and his throne in a war w ith Prussia. 
The Saturday Review marvelled at Bismarck's success. When he had 
said he would unite Germany without Austria, it seemed impossible. "But the 
war has made many things seem natural that before the war seemed very 
unnatural." Prussia had made it clear to the Review that there was no 
Germany unless Prussia lead it. This was the "very state of things which 
Count Bismarck has for three years been moving heaven and earth to bring 
about." The intoxicated Review went on: 
And at the moment when the thought is running through 
the minds of men that this new Germany must come 
into existence, the companion thought also makes 
itself felt that it is an excellent thing it would 
be so, and that there is something glorious and 
noble in owning the supremacy of a nation which 
could win such a battle as that of Sadowa.27 
The Illustrated London News was dazzled by Prussian success. "From 
first to last every scheme of the bloody drama has been a surprise .... 
Hopefully from "midst the ruins which the triumphant blows of Prussia had 
strewn round" a lasting peace among the Great powers would develop. No 
longer did the News view the Prussians as the sole party responsible for the 
war. Austria had been persistently contentious and haughty, and the Austrian 
possession of Venetia could not be overlooked as a cause of its downfall. At 
second glance, moreover, the Prussians had not behaved so outrageously. 
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Although Berlin had put forth some "frivolous" pretext in preparation for the 
war and its tone had been "insolent and overbearing," Prussia represented "in 
the main a great national sentiment" and had gained the hegemony of 
Germany with its "ambition, energy, resoluteness, promptitude and, above all 
prowess in the field." If anyone could show how the defunct German 
Confederation had advanced even indirectly the cause of human progress, he 
deserved a reputation for genius. "It condemned a noble race — one of the 
most highly cultivated in the world, in science, art, and letters — to the pity 
and sometimes the derision of it s neighbors . . . ." Such a situation was now a 
relic of the past.28 
New Monthly Magazine also illustrated the changing view of 
Bismarckian Prussia. At the outbreak of the war, it complained that Europe 
was to "be drenched in blood through the wantonness either of the Prussian 
sovereign or his tool and prompter Bismarck." Following the war, however, 
New Monthly Magazine felt obligated to refrain from determining the 
aggressor and instead postulated the familiar idea that North Germany was a 
natural ally of Britain. Fraser's Magazine also viewed Germany's 
development toward unification favorably. "If ever then there would seem to 
have been a m anifest destiny at work in the evolution of human things, we 
may be excused for fancying it revealed in the realization of hopes so long 
deferred ...." Blackwood's Magazine observed that all were ready to discuss 
Prussia's successful marches, "Napoleonic feats," which destroyed the 
Habsburg Monarchy and laid the groundwork for a new empire; 
A month ago it was believed that Prussia would 
find in her present humbled antagonists an over­
match ; now we see her throttling Austria with one 
hand, and waving off France with the other. The 
'armed intervention' which might have become a fact 
had the defeat of Konnigratz been less decisive, 
is reserved for further consideration, and our 
potent friend over the way is not master of the 
situation.29 
Even Punch could find an appropriate place for the firmness of the Iron 
Chancellor: 
When a correspondent writes of perils encountered 
in his scamper not over American prairies, but through 
Hyde Park of regal fam e, and dismally relates 
how he was hunted, robbed and maimed on that pri­
vileged plain by Anglo-Saxon savages, Mr. Punch, 
raising his solemn eyes to the imperturbable Woods 
and Forests, says, with a despairing sigh, 'Wanted, 
a Bismarck.' 3° 
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The Daily News saw the Prussians "advancing with a rapidity and 
conquering violence" which was "truly marvellous." Benedek's failure was 
puzzling, but to those who had observed the progress of the war, nothing was 
"more striking than the extraordinary promptitude of Prussian movements." 
The performance of the Prussian military had been extremely impressive, and 
its successes had "substituted Count von Bismarck for Napoleon III as the 
central figure in Europe." A first step had been taken toward proving the 
Germans would no longer be content with the sovereignty of the air. To the 
News the next and ultimate step would be the incorporation of the South 
German states in a united Germany. 
The Post was as confused by Benedek's lack of success as were the other 
papers and magazines. It was likewise greatly affected by the impact of 
Konnigratz, which it ranked with Waterloo as one of the decisive battles of the 
world. Although the Post doubted that the News was correct about Prussia 
swallowing all Germany, it had to admit that development was "possible and 
now made much more easv." 32 
The Times commented on Austria's failure to advance, then launched 
into a tirade of praise for the Prussian accomplishment. No campaign in 
modern history had been "more brilliant and astonishing; no victory more 
complete and more speedily won." Prussia had backed its words with action. 
The superior prowess of the victors had been conclusive. The Prussians had 
spirit an d organization. German possibilities were now unlimited. Southern 
Germany, like the North might be totally absorbed by Prussia.33 
The Times also saw Count Bismarck in a different light. Even before 
Konnigratz the Times had predicted that Bismarck might soon be "a demigod 
not only in the eyes of the Prussians, but of a ll patriotic Germans." He knew 
what everybody in Germany wa nted, unity. It was "not easy to feel unmixed 
admiration, and still less, to feel cordial sympathy for a man of Bismarck's 
temper. But strange instruments are often required to work out great purposes 
and woe to us if we were always to reject the desirable end because we feel 
inclined to quarrel with the questionable means." Although the Times denied 
the charge of hero-worship, it had to admit that if "either unity or closer union 
was necessary for G ermany, it was only to be achieved by such means as 
Prussia and Count Bismarck have supplied." 34 
The Manchester Guardian was as stunned as anyone else by the 
suddenness of Prussian success, but it believed that people might be ascribing 
too much importance to the results of the battle. Ringing the death knoll for 
Austria might be premature. Not until late July was the Guardian willing to 
concede that Austria was "excluded from the councils of Germany." It was 
then quick to add, however, that "a strong and united Germany would 
probably find that no neighbor viewed its accession to maturity with so little 
ill-will as England...." 35 
"The daring design of Count Bismarck to develop Prussia into a great 
BRITISH PRESS AND PUB LIC RE AC TION T O PRU SSIAN PO LICY 15  
North German kingdom extending from the Baltic to the Main, may be nearer 
its consumation than we have supposed," said the Daily Telegraph. A great 
Teutonic empire to check French ambitions and act as barrier against the 
semi-barbarianism of Russia has "always been a cherished dream." The 
triumph of Pruss ia over Austria signalled "the triumph of Protestant, Liberal, 
and Teutonic elements in Germany over the Catholic, aristocratic, and mixed 
races...." Architect of this great victory was Bismarck, outside of Napoleon 
III the only great statesman in Europe.36 
Members of Parliament expressed the same sentiments that had been 
in evidence in the press. Only Sir George Bowyer spoke with disfavor toward 
Prussia, accusing his countrymen of worshipping success and attributing 
Prussia's victories to the needle gun, not to its "military skill or valor." The 
ingenuity of a gun maker had been a welcome aid to Prussia's "system of utter 
buccaneering." 37 
Other speakers were more favorable, however, to Prussia's new position. 
Mr. Laing of Wick blamed the Thirty Years War, the War of Austrian 
Succession, and the Seven Years War on weakness and division within 
Germany. He expressed the view that a strong Germany would lead to a more 
stable Europe and was doubly glad that this new strong state would be 
Protestant. Mr. Horseman remarked that events had "falsified every 
calculation." A campaign of ten days had brought greater changes to Europe 
than had occurred in Europe since 1815. Horseman belittled the idea that 
Prussia owed its success to the needle gun: "Was it the needle gun that 
enabled her to overrun Saxony and penetrate the passes of Bohemia without 
meeting a foe? Was it the needle gun that enabled her commanders, with a 
smaller army to concentrate a larger force on the critical field that decided the 
war?" The Prussians had made it clear that the map of Europe would not be 
"recast at Paris." 38 
c Leaders in both parties were quick to add their best wishes to the new 
Germany. The new Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley, could not see how a 
North German Empire would be to Britain "any injury, any menace, or any 
detriment." Gladstone went further. Germany's weakness had been a 
weakness to Europe and a "perpetual cause of difficulty and apprehensions." 
Its cultural excellence could not be disputed. Germany contained "the most 
numerous race in Europe; one of the most intelligent, and, perhaps, the most 
highly intellectual — having traditions inferior to those of no other people.' 
The developments in central Europe could only be beneficial to the peace and 
well-being of Europe. 39 
There was general agreement in Britain about Germany. The Prussians 
had won a battle, a war, and supremacy in Germany not because of one 
weapon, though it had been an important attribute. They had been intelligent, 
disciplined and vigorous throughout the war. Bismarck's policy and Moltke s 
armies had met with deserved success. No one could help but be impressed by 
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the emergence of the st rong North Germany created by Prussian energy and 
efficiency. Count Bismarck's image had changed radically. The foreign 
statesman hated in Britain had become one of the most respected. 
There were few dissenting voices as the British almost unanimously 
rejoiced at Prussian success. When compared to the feelings of the previous 
few years, it might appear that British opinion had undergone a drastic and 
dramatic change. A careful observation reveals, however, that British 
satisfaction was the logical culmination of previous attitudes and quite 
consistent with Britain's earlier views. The Prussian people had long been 
singled out as energetic, industrious, intelligent and generally admirable. 
Moreover, the British press had consistently emphasized with some pleasure 
that the Prussians not only shared their Protestant faith with the British but 
were related to them racially. Of course the British most rejoiced because of 
assumed strategic benefits acruing from the new Germany. The question must 
be asked, however, if these assumptions were not based on the above 
mentioned feelings and attitudes and if they were, did they persist well into the 
century or even later, and how great was their influence? 
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WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
David C. Needham 
For nearly a century the Republican party has attempted to break into 
the Solid South and recapture the position of strength it held there during 
Reconstruction. Such efforts have always fallen short of the expectation. 
Although many factors help to explain this failure, one of the most persistent 
and perplexing questions for Republicans has been the place of the Negro in 
our society, and within the party itself. In the post-Reconstruction period, 
Republican leaders knew they must cut into some area of Democratic strength 
or remain a sectional, minority party. The most obvious and most tempting 
Democratic stronghold was the Solid South. G. 0. P. spokesmen advocated 
two divergent approaches toward the white South and the Negro. On the one 
hand, there were those who wished to reinvigorate the Reconstruction alliance 
between the "Black and Tans" (southern organizations of bi-racial 
composition) and the national party. Such a course necessitated the active 
intervention of t he federal government to protect the political rights of bla cks 
in the South. On the other hand, others proposed to abandon the Negro and 
actively encourage the development of a "Lily White" Republican party in the 
southern states. This would, so the argument ran, bring about a coalition of 
the "best people" of both sections — a reemergence of the old Whig alliance of 
pre-Civil War days. This development would be consummated by offering 
patronage, internal improvements, subsidies and tariff prote ction to southern 
interests and politicians.1 
Late nineteenth-century Republican presidents adopted, at one time or 
another, both of these approaches, The frustrating of these efforts by Bourbon 
Democrats caused G. O. P. leaders to return to the traditional policies of 
sectionalism and the "Bloody Shirt." The last attempt for many decades to 
aid the Negro politically was undertaken by the Harrison administration. This 
was the Force Bill, introduced by Henry Cabot Lodge, which sought federal 
regulation and certification of state and local elections. The death of this 
measure at the hands of the Senate accurately reflected a public climate grown 
cold toward Negro civil rights.2 Between the years 1890 and 1910, the nation 
acquiesced in the segregation and disfranchisement of the Negro in the South. 
The Supreme Court provided its legal imprimatur to "Jim Crow," most 
notably in the Plessy v. Ferguson case in 1896. "Jim Crow" had a wider 
experience than just the South, however, as the activities of the federal 
government and some northern states and communities indicated.3 
A new departure in the Republican party's relations witth the white 
South and the Negro was implemented during the Progressive Era. Ironically, 
this reform period coincided with one of the high points of racism in American 
history. The resulting disfranchisement of blacks and the drawing of th e color 
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line offered yet another opportunity for resurrecting a strong, white 
Republican party in the South. In addition, many southern political reformers 
believed that the end of "Negro domination"#meant that the South could now 
afford a vigorous two-party system. This argument was particularly appealing 
to con servative Gold Democrats in the South who were unhappy with the 
control of their party by the Bryan element. Also lending its strength to this 
new impetus toward Republicanism in the South was the significant growth of 
southern industry, and an accompanying upsurge of protectionist sentiment 
there. It was with this hopeful setting in mind that Republican strategists 
renewed their efforts to break the Solid South.4 And it is against this backdrop 
that this paper will attempt to discuss William Howard Taft's relations with 
the R epublican party in South Carolina. 
After his election in 1908, President-elect Taft addressed a "possum, 
taters, and Simmon beer" banquet in Atlanta, Georgia. In this speech Taft 
outlined his forthcoming "Southern Policy." He realistically told the Atlanta 
audience that he did not expect a political revolution in the South, because 
southerners were "conservative and they do not change in a mercurial way." 
He continued by recognizing that the expression of an administration "takes 
its color" in the character of federal officials appointed. He assured them that 
he would "spare no effort" to find out the facts in respect to the character of 
the proposed appointees. Furthermore, he promised to select only those whose 
"character, reputation and standing in the community" commend them to 
their fellow citizens. Only in this way, he concluded, could the %'sense °f 
alienism" be ended between the South and appointed federal officials.5 
The Inaugural Address offered the new president an excellent 
opportunity to synthesize and elaborate upon his past statements about the 
South and the Negro. Taft said he saw his chief purpose not in effecting a 
change in the southern electoral vote, but in increasing tolerance and 
respectable political opposition in the South. Considerations on this point, he 
noted, could not be complete without reference to the Negro race. President 
Taft stated that recognition of distinguished Negro men was just and should 
be pursued "when suitable occasion offers." On the other hand, he continued: 
... it may well admit of doubt whether ... an appointment of one 
of their number to a local office in a community in which the race 
feeling is so widespread and acute as to interfere with ... the 
local government business ... is of sufficient benefit... to 
outweigh the recurrence and increase of race feeling which such an 
appointment is likely to engender. 6 
Taft cautioned, however, against the manufacture of race prejudice in the 
interest of individual political preferment. 
President Taft continued by viewing as a failure the movement of 
northern friends of the Negro to aid him through the protection of the suffrage 
"against the prevailing sentiment of the South." He said what remained was 
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the Fifteenth Amendment, with qualifications by the states which squared 
with that amendment. Once this was accomplished, it was not within the 
province of the federal government to, as Taft put it, "interfere with the 
regulation by Southern states of their domestic affairs." He maintained that 
this was now being fairly accomplished by most southern legislatures, and the 
danger of control by ", an ignorant electorate had therefore passed." As a 
result, he continued, there was an increased interest by southern whites in the 
welfare of the Negro. Taft concluded, however, that blacks must still base 
their major hope on "their own industry, self-restraint, thrift and business 
success...." 7 
Even before his inauguration, Taft gave indications that he would abide 
by his "Southern Policy." A clear-cut opportunity was provided by the 
reemergence of a longstanding feud between William D. Crum and the city of 
Charleston, South Carolina. Crum, a Negro physician, was nominated by 
Theodore Roosevelt in December, 1902, for the post of Collector of Customs 
at Charleston. Southern opposition led by Senator Benjamin Tillman staved 
off confirmation by the Senate until January, 1905. In the interim, Roosevelt 
provided Crum with recess appointments. The struggle grew into a cause 
celebre, which, although it helped insure Roosevelt's nomination in 1904, was 
sharply questioned by southern public opinion and many northern journals.8 
In December, 1908, the struggle was renewed when Roosevelt sent the 
black physician's name to the Senate for renomination. The reaction of 
Charleston and the South was, in large part, expressed by a resolution of the 
South Carolina legislature, which read: 
In the all wise plan of the Creator of the universe, the white race 
has been made the superior of all others and to it is committed the 
problems and destiny of this great republic. We consider it (Crum's 
appointment) unfortunate, one tended to indulge the hope of social 
equality in the hearts and minds of the negroes of our Country and a. 
useless and needless affront to the white citizenship of Charleston.9 
A filibuster led by Senator Tillman successfully blocked the Negro collector's 
confirmation in February, 1909. The next step would be up to the incoming 
president. 
In the meantime, the object of all this acrimony had anxiously been 
following the fight for his renomination in W ashington, and the utterances of 
Taft in the South. Writing to Whitefield McKinlay, a member of the 
Tuskegee machine, Dr. Crum asked what he thought of Taft's "very 
significant remark...in his speech at Atlanta, Ga." He added that he was 
"somewhat afraid of Taft."10 Early in February, 1909, Crum asked McKinlay 
where he stood in his fight for confirmation. McKinlay reluctantly informed 
his fellow South Carolinian that he was "in the soup."11 Reacting to the news 
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of his failure to be confirmed, Crum thanked his ally for his efforts and 
contrasted it to the lack of interest by many other blacks. He added that his 
fight, if c ompletely lost, would crush Negro hopes and aspirations for years. 
He concluded with the query, "What am I to do? Some say compromise, 
others say stick, what do you advise?"'2 The answer came shortly and would 
be bitterly disappointing to Crum. 
Whitefield McKinlay was also in close contact with his mentor, Booker 
T. Washington. Informing the Negro educator of Crum's defeat, McKinlay 
stated that, "the jig is up & it has depressed me very much as it is a fight we 
cannot afford to lose." ^Washington responded with sorrow at the news, but 
added that Crum could not complain that his friends had not stood by h im. 
He also revealed his fear that Taft "might feel if he (Crum) could not be 
confirmed by the Senate at one time, he could not be confirmed at another 
time." Leveling some of the blame on Crum, Washington added that other 
Negro appointees from the South were usually able to get strong backing from 
white n eighbors despite newspaper and political talk. Crum, he concluded, 
"does not seem to know how to get such influence." 14 
President-elect Taft's position on the Crum controversy had been defined 
in his Atlanta speech, portions of which had clearly been motivated by the 
situation. Late in February, Taft apparently contacted Booker T. Washington 
and a sked him to induce Crum to resign voluntarily. The Negro educator 
complied and later informed Taft that Crum would resign with "good 
spirits." Theodore Roosevelt, who obviously approved, indicated his delight 
at "B ooker Washington's attitude and what he says Crum will do. That is 
first-rate."'5Dr. Crum resigned on February 27, 1909, to take effect with the 
change of administration. A week after taking office, Taft sent to the Senate 
the name of Edward W. Durant, Jr. to replace the Negro physician. Durant 
was white, an Independent Democrat, northern-born and a Yale graduate. He 
was quickly confirmed by the Senate.16 
During the first half of his administration, President Taft's "Southern 
Policy" was most clearly discernable in the removal of blacks from federal 
offices in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. But the pattern was also evident 
in South Carolina. In July, 1909, Joshua Wilson, a black man, was ousted as 
Postmaster at Florence, reportedly because of white opposition. Taft 
requested advice on a replacement from the editor of the Charleston News and 
Courier, "Deacon" James Calvin Hemphill, and an Independent Democratic 
adviser, George A. Gor don of Savannah, Georgia, However, neither of their 
candidates was selected. Instead, Lewis J. Kuker replaced Wilson and it was 
charged that he was a "Lily White" supporter.17 Other blacks reported los ing 
their positions in South Carolina were Julius Durant, the Postmaster at 
Paxville; Deputy Revenue Collector Robert E. Williams of Newberry; and 
James A. Brier, Revenue Inspector at Greenville. The only Negro still holding 
office after this purge was Robert Smalls, Collector of C ustoms at Beaufort.18 
THE S OUTH CA ROLINA H ISTO RICAL A SSO CIATION 
In the wake of these removals, William T. Andrews, a "Black and Tan" 
leader and editor of the Sumter Defender, wrote Whitefield McKinlay asking 
"whether the attitude of the President is such toward the appointment of our 
folks down here that it would be really e ffort vainly spent trying to secure 
recognition."19 
The "Black and Tan" organization in South Carolina was led by a Negro 
state chairman, Edmund H. Deas. The "Duke of Darlington," as he was 
nicknamed, had firm support from William T. Andrews and other black 
republicans, as well as tenuous backing from white federal officeholders. The 
off-again, on-again "Lily White" organization was headed by John G. Capers, 
national committeeman from South Carolina. A native of Charleston and son 
of an Episcopal bishop, Capers had been recruited from the ranks of the 
"Commercial Democrats" during the Roosevelt administration. His 
lieutenants were Loomis W. C. Blalock, a textile manufacturer from Laurens 
County, and Dan H. Wallace, an ex-Democrat whose father was still a leading 
voice in state Democratic circles.20 
Late in September, 1910, the "Black and Tan" faction, angered at the 
ousting of blacks from office, called a meeting of the state convention to select 
a new executive committee. This convention was composed of more than sixty 
blacks and fewer than ten whites. Though boycotted by the Capers-BIalock 
faction, the convention unexpectedly ousted Deas from his post, reportedly on 
instructions from Washington, and replaced him with Joseph W. Tolbert, a 
white man from Greenwood. However, Deas was allowed to make a ringing 
speech charging Taft with drawing the color line in his South Carolina 
appointments. This speech, one newspaper reported, accurately reflected the 
sentiment of Negro delegates against the President's "Southern Policy." This 
same source indicated that the "Lily Whites" planned to hold a convention of 
their own the following month at which Negroes would not be welcome.21 
Early in October, 1910, John Capers made a visit to the White House for 
an audience with Taft. Upon emerging, Capers issued a call for white 
Republicans and dissatisfied Democrats to meet for a convention later that 
month. In a letter to over one hundred supporters, he said the administration 
thought "the time was ripe" to launch a "respectable" opposition party in 
their state. Concurrently, William T. Andrews reported to Whitefield 
McKinlay that the "LilyWhites" were boasting of plans for running 
"respectable candidates" for Congress. He said his faction intended to 
retaliate by running Negro candidates to see just who had the Republican 
votes in South Carolina. He asked for help from Tuskegee "to save the only 
Republican organization in ... which the Negro has a controlling voice." The 
black editor vowecf to " leave no stone unturned to expose Capers and send 
him to the rear for life."23The initial attitude of the President toward this 
struggle was shown in his correspondence with Capers. Taft said he was "very 
glad to know that you are doing in So uth Carolina what has been done in 
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North Carolina and Tennessee. You have my best wishes."24 
An article in the Washington Star a few days later suggested that the 
President, upon advice from Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock, had 
withdrawn his endorsement of the "Lily White" convention. It stated that the 
convention, "coming ahead of the elections, had begun to stir the negro 
voters...." It was also reported that a prominent federal official in South 
Carolina had told Hitchcock that "it would never do to let Capers put on foot 
a pure white Republican party." After another meeting with Taft, Capers 
announced that the convention would still be held, but without the presence of 
office-holders or the President's endorsement.25 
On October 27, 1910, the "Lily White" convention was called to order. 
There were 113 white delegates in attendance, none of whom were 
office-holders. In his keynote address, Capers told his audience that the Negro 
"was not made nor fit for political equalization with you and me." He 
maintained that his organization was the beginning of "the emancipation of 
political thought and action in South Carolina...." Capers also charged that 
northern and western Republicans had kept their white southern brothers too 
long in political bondage to the Negro. In order to keep black Republican 
support, he continued, Negroes should be appointed to office in the North 
rather than "Africanizing the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast" states. The 
convention duly elected Loomis Blalock as state chairman, established 
executive committees for the seven districts, and wrote a platform which 
endorsed the Taft administration. However, Capers' faction turned down 
Andrews' challenge by re fusing to run candidates for Congress until 1912. 
During the remainder of his term of office, President Taft continued, 
with only few exceptions, his southern appointment policy. He reiterated his 
belief that this policy was intended to reduce race friction, and to improve the 
quality and efficiency of government service. On the other hand, Taft did 
appoint some Negroes to important offices outside the South, including the 
posting, in 1910, of William D. Crum to the ambassadorial position in 
Liberia. Nevertheless, Negro "radicals" like W. E. B. Du Bois and some 
Tuskegee allies charged that the "Southern Policy," or at least its 
implementation at lower levels, was racially motivated.27 However, challenges 
to Taft's renomination by 1911 caused a subtle shift in the administration s 
position. This shift may also have come from a reassessment of the relative 
strergths of the fa ctions within certain of the southern Republican parties. 
These political changes dictated at least a toning down of rI aft's "Southern 
Policy." In any case, it should be noted that after a decade of purging there 
were very few black men left to replace in the South. 
The patronage power and influence of Postmaster General Hitchcock 
were very obviously used to rescue the "Black and Ian faction in South 
Carolina. In November, 1910, a manifesto from Capers to his "Lily White 
followers indicated this danger. He asked his supporters not to be alarmed if 
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some of those "higher up," who claimed to represent the President, were now 
organizing the officeholders for the purpose of controlling the delegation to the 
next convention. He insisted that such an organization would have to join the 
"regular party with us; go to Joe (Tolbert) and his sixty-six colored boys or 
stand out in direct opposition to the known and expressed sentiments of the 
President ...."28 
Capers' optimism must have been shaken by subsequent patronage 
defeats. In December, 1910, a long contested position went to Laurens G. 
Young, who was confirmed that month as Postmaster at Union. It was 
reported that Capers had backed Dan Wallace for the post. Also that month, 
Frederick Minshall was approved as Postmaster at Abbeville, ousting the 
"Lily White" incumbant. Both of the appointees, however, were white men. 
Early in January, 1911, the News and Courier suggested that efforts would be 
made by Hitchcock to have the "Black and Tan" faction declared the regular 
organization. This paper also reported that an early convention would be held 
by this faction to voice its support for Taft's renomination. Concern by the 
"Lily Whites" over these developments was indicated by a conference that 
month between Blalock and the Postmaster General. The "Lily White" state 
chairman later admitted that no agreement was reached on future 
appointments, nor on the faction which was to control the delegation to the 
1912 convention.29 
Traditional historical accounts of the Taft administration have made 
much of th e President s political ineptitude and vacillating manner. Many of 
these accounts have also maintained that he did not mount a renomination 
effort until after his hand was forced by Robert La Follette and Theodore 
Roosevelt. A more recent interpretation takes exception with this view, and 
states that sometime in 1911 a "hardened" President made the decision to 
seek renomination. A key figure in the renomination effort was Charles 
Dewey Hilles, an Old Guard supporter and an able though neophyte Ohio 
politician, whom Taft selected as his third personal secretary, and, 
subsequently, as his campaign manager.30 
As early as June, 1911, Hilles made an assessment for Taft of the party 
situation in the South and other regions. He reported a sizable number of 
southern and western members of the national committee at odds with the 
administration, including John Capers of South Carolina. However, Hilles 
assured Taft that he had already been in touch with twenty-two of the national 
committeemen, and they had expressed loyalty to the President. He added 
at least as many more wo uld "do the bidding of the President's friends."31 
In December, the accuracy of Hilles' assessment was indicated in the 
outcome of the Republican National Committee meeting. The administration 
forces, by a vote of forty-four to seven, routed the supporters of Roosevelt on 
every issue, including an effort to extend the primary de vice. The New York 
Times also wryly reported that Taft, in his earlier days of optimism 
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concerning a "new Republicanism in the South," had suggested the pruning 
of southern delegations. But, it added, "the exigencies of politics had led him 
to realize that it would be unwise to cut off delegates that are notorious for 
their unw avering support of the administration." 32 
Even before the national committee meeting, Hilles wrote to Republican 
state leaders whom he considered loyal to Taft for their evaluations of local 
conditions. As a result of these communications, and White House 
conferences, Hilles developed a plan to effect the renomination of the 
President. One of the main strategems was the early selection of delegates 
committed to Taft before his opponents could get organized and begin active 
canvassing. In January, 1912, therefore, he wrote Taft managers in the 
South, and elsewhere, to hold district and state conventions as early as 
possible. Acting on his advice, eight of the twelve southern organizations 
issued calls for their conventions in February and March, while two others 
called theirs to meet early in April.33 
In the course of the pre-convention campaign it became apparent that 
Hilles had chosen to enlist the support of "Black and Tan" elements in certain 
southern states, most notably Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. As a 
result, Hilles threw his support to a group of federal offi ceholders who were 
authorized to direct the renomination effort in South Carolina. In addition, 
the Postmaster General admitted that a controversy between two claimants 
for the state chairmanship had caused his department to depart from standard 
patronage practices. He said that the administration was temporarily 
consulting Wilmot L. Harris, Postmaster at Charleston, on appointments.34 
In November, 1911, a state newspaper reported that both factions would 
likely send a full quota of eighte en delegates to the national convention, thus 
precipitating a contest over seating. The same source predicted that the Lily 
Whites" would support Taft, while the "Black and Tans would look 
elsewhere. However, it added that a strong effort would be made by 
officeholders "to whip the negroes into line for the President. The officials 
listed as "black herders" were J. Duncan Adams, U. S. Marshall; U. S. 
Attorney Ernest F. Cochran; and Postmaster Wilmot L. Harris.3 I hat same 
month, Capers wrote Hilles that the officeholders selected by I aft s advisers 
could not control the "Black and Tan" convention, "composed ... of about 
115 negroes and 10 white men ... (nor) instruct its delegates. He added that 
it seemed time that Taft's "real friends" were placed on guard. 
In mid-February, 1912, J. Duncan Adams wrote Hilles that he was 
having trouble keeping peace among the blacks. He stated that T. L. Grant, a 
Charleston Negro, was loyal but had antagonized other members of his race in 
his fight for a delegate-at-large post. However, he cautiously assured Hilles 
that "if I am able to manage them there will be eighteen delegates for the 
President... that will stick to the last, win or lose.' Shortly thereafter, Adams 
sent Hilles an article in a state paper inspired by Capers, which criticized the 
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"Black and Tans" for their lopsided Negro representation. Adams did not 
deny the statement, but laid the responsibility for the condition on Capers. He 
said that under Capers' leadership the state chairman had always been black, 
and that the delegation to the last convention had been composed of twelve 
Negroes and six whites. He concluded that, "unless our plans fail this time, we 
will have an equal number, nine whites and nine colored men ...." 37 
The same month, Hilles received a letter from the "Lily White" leader. 
Capers said he was informed that "Postmaster Harris, Tolbert and others of 
that crew were in the city (Washington) and I am forced to conclude that the 
administration prefers their organization as a means of endorsement." He 
charged that twenty-two of the twenty-five members of the state committee, 
six of the seven district chairmen, and forty-two out of forty-three county 
chairmen of the opposition organization were Negroes. Capers closed by 
saying his faction was called "Lily White" because it protested against the 
organization in th e state being all black.38 
Late in February, Taft's managers wrote of their concern over the effect 
Roosevelt's candidacy would have on their convention later that month. 
Adams asked the administration to send a good Negro speaker who could 
"give a rousing speech" in aid of their efforts. Hilles suggested the name of a 
prominent Atlanta politician, Henry Lincoln Johnson, as a visiting black 
fireman — and the offer was accepted with alacrity. After the 
convention adjourned, Adams wrote of a "grand victory" for Taft. "I heartily 
thank you for sending that good fellow ... Johnson;" he continued, "He with 
Maj. J. H. Fordham of Orangeburg, S. C., one of our old and tried 
wheelhorses, saved the day on resolutions and instructions." Cochran wrote 
that the test fight over resolutions endorsing Taft was sharp but won with a 
large majority. He also praised Johnson as a man who was "of considerable 
service to us in various ways."39 
By mid-March, the South Carolina managers could report that the 
district conventions had met and lined up solidly for Taft. The problem now, 
they suggested, was to keep the delegates in the fold. Shortly thereafter, Hilles 
wrote Adams that his attention had been called to a South Carolina delegate, 
William T. Andrews, visiting Roosevelt headquarters in Washington. 
Somewhat apologetically, Adams replied that Andrews, who was instructed 
for Taft, was doing all he could to line up delegates for Roosevelt. He added 
that there were several other delegates he could not vouch for "if conditions 
should develop that might justify an even break for them to land on the side of 
the winner." 40 
Several reports to Hilles from South Carolina also indicated that the 
"Lily Whites" were having a di fficult time trying to get enough delegates to 
their st ate convention. Patronage reverses and loss of support had obviously 
taken its toll. In May, Ernest Cochran wrote that the opposition seemed 
anxious to rally to Roosevelt, but "seem afraid" to take sides. Nevertheless, 
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the "Lily White" convention met and endorsed Roosevelt, but were only able 
to contest two Taft delegate seats at the convention, both unsuccessfully. In a 
final pre-convention summary, Adams told Hilles that there was not the 
slightest hope of R oosevelt getting more than four or five votes from the Taft 
delegation. He added that he had cautioned John Capers against "attempting 
to buy any of my delegation with the enormous corruption fund said to be 
behind the Colonel ...."41 
The early organization of Taft delegates by Hilles, particularly in the 
South, paid dividends at the Republican National Convention in 1912. Nor 
was this advantage offset by the repeated preferential primary losses by 
President Taft to Theodore Roosevelt, his major challenger for the 
nomination. In spite of a few defections, delegates from the southern states, 
both white and black, provided the bulk of the narrow majority which 
renominated Taft. In the final balloting, 223 southern delegates voted for 
Taft while forty-five either abstained or voted for Roosevelt. Negro delegates 
voted fifty-four to eight in favor of the President, including six of the nine from 
South Carolina.42 In the final analysis, Roosevelt was hoisted on his own 
petard. The "steamroller" methods and organizational tactics he had initiated 
in his renomination fight in 1904, and perfected in the nomination of I aft in 
1908, were used against him with telling effect in 1912. 
William Howard Taft, like many of his Republican predecessors, began 
his administration with the hope of strengthening his party in the South. He 
made numerous visits to the South, including his precedent-breaking 
campaign tour in 1908, in which he appealed to the customs, sentimentality, 
and interests of that section. Like many northerners, Taft accepted or 
acquiesed in the subtler forms of discrimination and disfranchisement 
practiced against black Americans. "Jim Crow' also flourished in the 
Washington bureaus and offices during his term, a dismal record superceded 
only by the Wilson administration. Taft indicated a paternalistic attitude 
toward Negroes which was, in part, a legacy of his experiences as 
Governor-General of the Philippines. It can be said that Taft was very much a 
product, and a mirror, of his times. 
Taft also instituted a policy regarding Negro appointments which 
undoubtedly gratified much of the white South. While this policy did not vary 
too greatly from that used by previous G. O. P. administrations, including that 
of Th eodore Roosevelt, the extent of black removals and the official sanction 
given it must be considered unique. When Taft assumed office there were 
literally hundreds of federal posts in the South filled by Negroes. By the end of 
his administration there were six blacks still holding presidential offices (one 
of these in South Carolina), and they disappeared during the Wilson 
administration. The slamming of the "door of hope' symbolized for black 
Americans a total abandonment by one of the few remaining institutions 
presumably friendly to his interests. Moreover, the appointment of a few 
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Negroes to posts outside the South did not offset the impact this policy had on 
southern black Republicans. 
It may well be, as some have suggested, that the Republican party in th e 
South may emerge in strength under a policy which minimizes the role of the 
Negro, and, instead, maximizes other economic and political issues. Such 
recent developments as Richard Nixon's election strength in the South in 
1968 may signal the success of this approach. However, there are still forces at 
work today in the southern Republican party which give one pause. The 
Republican party, as a black newspaper suggested to Taft, must remain 
committed to the defense of human rights as well as property rights. 
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REFORMIST AND HUMANITARIAN 
CRITICISM OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM, 1878-1882. 
John V. Crangle 
The late nineteenth century was a time of increasing humanitarian 
activity in Britain. Upper and middle class reformers and humanitarians 
realized that the industrialization of Britain had created many new problems 
while aggravating some old ones. The masses of the United Kingdom were the 
victims of exploitation, poverty, disease, and neglect. Many reformers blamed 
the sacrosanct concept of laissez faire and demanded political action to check 
exploitation and alleviate suffering. Humanitarians generally sought to apply 
the principles of the Christian religion to social and economic problems and 
often relied more upon private philanthropy than upon political activity.1 
Agitation for domestic reform had a concomitant in humanitarian and 
reformist concern for the progress and consequences of overseas imperialism. 
Many reformers thought that the money, energy, and attention required by an 
expansionistic imperial policy could be more wisely used meeting the needs of 
the people of Britain. Indeed, some reformers and humanitarians thought that 
expansion abroad and domestic reform were mutually exclusive. The belief 
that reform and imperialism were incompatible was an old Liberal 
proposition.2 Early in his career W. E. Gladstone, later the leader of the 
Liberal Party, believed the colonies tended inexorably toward political 
maturity and independence. Consequently, he argued that the colonies should 
be prepared for self-government.3 
Gladstone s attitude toward the empire changed and by the 1870's he 
was no longer convinced that the Empire would inevitably disintegrate. 
However, he never grew to like the idea of imperial expansion and often 
complained during Beaconsfield's last government that expansion drained off 
funds needed for the Liberal program of domes tic reform/ During the period 
1878-1880 a host of Liberal candidates echoed Gladstone's arguments and 
accused the Tories of neglecting the welfare of the people of England in favor 
of expansionist adventures abroad.5 
Much of the criticism of expansion and of the administration of the 
Empire was voiced by politicians, but not all, and in any case the line between 
humanitarians and politicians is not easy to draw. Some politicians were 
humanitarians and some humanitarians became involved in politics. A prime 
example of the latter hybrid was Dr. Richard M. Pankhurst,6 husband of the 
famous suffragette Emmeline Pankhurst.7 Dr. Pankhurst was a radical with a 
passionate interest in soc ial reform. He served as legal counsel in the case of 
Chorlton v Lings (1868) when 5,346 women householders claimed the vote 
under existing law. In 1882 he drafted the Women's Property Bill which 
sought to increase the property rights of married women. So vigorous was his 
concern for the rights of women that he and his wife left the Liberal Party in 
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1884, when Gladstone refused to put Women's Suffrage into the Reform Bill 
of 1884, and joined the Independent Labour Party. Pankhurst was highly 
antagonized by Tory expansionism because he thought that it prevented 
reform. In 1879 he offered an anti-expansionist resolution at a meeting of the 
Manchester Liberal Association which charged that 
The Government during its tenure of office 
has seriously neglected domestic legis­
lation, and the prosecution of its foreign 
policy has wasted the natural resources.8 
An important factor in humanitarian and reforming activity was religion, 
especially religious nonconformity. Many humanitarians were either 
clergymen themselves or members of a sect other than the Church of 
Lngland. Some such figures were involved in politics and some were not, but 
of those who were a number were Radical Liberals. Thus Thomas Bayley 
Potter, a Unitarian and a Radical Liberal from Manchester, denounced 
imperial expansion on reformist and political grounds, arguing that 
Beaconsfield's "spirited foreign policy" was a trick to distract the attention of 
the pe ople of Britain from the dire need for social and economic reforms in 
England.10 
I he outbreak of the Afghan wars, which raged in sporadic fashion during 
the late 1870's angered many reformers and humanitarians both in and out of 
politics. The hostilities in Afghanistan began when the Viceroy of India, Lord 
Lytton, impetuously provoked a war without the authorization of the Tory 
government in London. The Prime Minister, although entertaining plans for a 
move against Afghanistan, did not want war at that time and was privatelv 
angry at Lytton .^Nevertheless, the ministry defended the Viceroy thereby 
provoking an avalanche of angry criticism by foes of the "forward policy." 13 
One of the critics who came out against the government on humanitarian 
and reformist grounds was Lt. Col. Robert Durie Osborn,14 a retired Army 
officer with many years of service in India . The son of an employee of the East 
India Company stationed in Ind ia, Osborn knew the Indian people well and 
was a zealous advocate of native rights and a vigorous critic of Lytton's callous 
disregard for Indian rights and sentiments, and for the rights of the native 
government of Afghanistan. Osborn castigated Lytton for causing a war of 
deliberately planned aggression, utterly unjustified." He blamed the 
government and the Prime Minister for fostering expansionism as part of the 
I ory program. 5 He explicitly denied the ministry's statement that Russia was 
interested in Afghanistan.14 
Fiscal reformers joined in opposing the Afghan War, but for quite 
different reasons than humanitarians. Fiscal reformers sought to cut the costs 
of government and wars cost money. Thus Samuel Laing,17 a critic of 'L ittle 
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Englandism', denounced the Afghan War as a conflict which provoked Russia 
and threatened international war. As Finance Minister in India in 1860 he 
had taken office determined to cut the budget deficits by reducing military 
costs. He remarked at that time, "the possibility of military reduction depends 
on peace.'19 He felt that Lytton and "what is called the 'Imperial Policy' 
were both dangerous and should be terminated.20 The Liberal Party was 
dedicated to the belief that taxes and the costs of go vernment should be cut as 
low as possible. Gladstone, as the leading spokesman of h is party, denounced 
the war as an "immense, unnatural, and unnecessary expenditure" which 
absorbed "enormous sums" which should have been spent for "profitable 
production." 21 
Critics of the ministry's "forward policy" hardly had time to catch their 
breath when another prancing proconsul caused a war in southern Africa with 
the Zulus. The government's policy of consolidation and expansion took the 
form of a plan for confederation, engineered by the Colonial Office, which 
sought to confederate the Boer and British states in southern Africa. By 
implication the plan threatened the autonomy of the Zulus, but Lord 
Carnarvon,23 the Colonial Secretary, and his agents were determined to 
implement the plan. The situation was complicated by the fact that droves of 
prospectors and miners were pouring into Zulu territory in search of diamonds 
in the newly discovered fields.24 
Carnarvon wanted to delay the implementation of the plan for an 
indefinite period due to the fact that British relations with Russia were 
seriously strained over disputes in the Near and Middle East and the 
government did not want to involve itself in additional difficulties in southern 
Africa. The Colonial Office explicitly directed the High Commissioner in 
southern Africa to maintain peaceful relations with the Zulus. The High 
Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere,25 was not deterred, however, and impetuously 
sent an altimatum to the Zulus. Upon the expiration of the ultimatum Frere 
ordered armed forces into action against the Zulus.26 
The unexpected outbreak of war provoked a barrage of Liberal criticism 
against the ministry and its forward policy. 27 John Morley,28 a mordant critic 
of Tory expansionism in India and Africa, lampooned Frere and branded the 
war as unjust. Morley asserted that the conflict distracted public attention 
from Britain's pressing domestic problems and declared, 
The strongest and most substantial reason 
against the policy of intermeddling... lies 
in the fact that the people and Government 
of England have at least as much as they can 
do if they attend to their own affairs. 
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He also charged that the actions of the ministry and its agents in Africa 
sapped the confidence of native peoples in British administrators in the 
colonies, thereby undermining future relations.29 
A number of non-political figures attacked the government for instigating 
the Zulu War. James Guiness Rogers,30 a prominent Congregationalist 
clergyman and a proponent of the application of Christian principles to public 
questions, denounced Carnarvon's plan for confederation as the fundamental 
cause of the conflict.31 Miss Frances Colenso,32 the humanitarian daughter of 
Bishop John W. Colenso,33 blamed Frere and other British officials as the 
instigators of the Zulu War. She rejected British charges that the government 
of the Zulu people was brutal and s tated that the real reason for the war was 
camouflaged by unprincipled officials who were collaborating with 
land-hungry colonists to despoil the Zulus of their property. Miss Colenso 
accused the British administration and military of conducting not only an 
unjust war but also of perpetrating atrocities against the natives: 
We destroyed crops and immense quantities 
of provisions... (and) carried off herds.... 
What had been the effect of our invasions 
of the Zululand ... a dreadful famine pre­
vailed last year in parts of the Zululand . 
The wretched people creeping about on all 
fours.... 
Indeed, Miss Colenso, who strongly subscribed to the belief that Britain had a 
providential role and mission to bring civilization and protection to primitive 
peoples, felt that the imperial administration had treacherously betrayed the 
trust by its aggressions against the Zulus.3J 
Two years after the Zulu War Miss Colenso published a critical study of 
the war entitled The History of the Zulu War and Its Origins,35 Later, in 1 884, 
she wrote a polemic called The Ruin of the Zululand which flayed the British 
administration and its policies in southern Africa. "Evil passions," she 
alleged, bred violence and exploitation in the region. 
Hasty or arbitary action on the part of 
the Government officials, assisted by 
the land-hunger and contempt for the 
colored races of a certain noisy faction 
amongst the colonists (had caused wars and 
injustice in southern Africa). 
She had compiled a "black national catalogue,' she said, which contained the 
details of British greed, aggression, and abuses in the region during and after 
the war. She accused the colonists of seeking pretexts for war. Such was the 
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case with Frere a nd the colonial newspaper editors who pretended that the 
Zulus were plotting a war in order to justify the British attack. The ruse 
sufficed to allow the colonists to steal native lands.37 Of course, she noted, 
appropriate falsehoods were conveyed to Parliament and the press in Britain 
to deceive the public. 
Benjamin Pine,39 a veteran colonial administrator and a former Governor 
of Natal from 1873 to 1875, drew upon his administrative experience in 
Africa in writing an indictment of colonial administration and of the Zulu 
War. He said that some administrators conspired with diamond mining 
companies to pay native employees with firearms. The weapons were 
sometimes used against British colonists. It was this sort of m yopic selfishness 
and exploitation, declared Pine, which turned the Zulus against the British. 
This kind of critism of the gun and drink trade was repeated by other 
humanitarians over the years. 41 
Humanitarians and reformers were by no means solely concerned with 
the consequences of imperialism upon England, but were solicitous about the 
welfare of native peoples in Africa and Asia. The British, strongly imbued 
with the ethic of duty espoused by the Evangelicals, believed themselves an 
"Elect People." This conviction became a principal element in late Victorian 
imperialism.42 Yet the burdens of the Empire were heavy. The humanitarians 
were willing to bear them and were shocked by corruption and callousness of 
imperial administrators who allowed and sometimes even conspired in the sale 
of drink, drugs, and guns to the natives.43 
Generally, university educated, religious, and idealistic in their concern 
for the peoples of Africa and Asia, the humani tarians wanted to give primitive 
peoples clothing, Christianity and literacy. The interest of the reformers was 
less altruistic. They wanted to cut the costs of the Empire and reduce the 
dangers of imperialism. Both groups served as watchdogs in the Empire. 
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OLIN D. JOHNSTON AND THE 
HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT CONTROVERSY 
Jay Bender 
It appeared that October 28, 1935 was going to be another ordinary 
Monday in the city of Columbia, capital of the state of South Carolina. One 
approaching the State Office Building, however, would have beheld an 
astonishing sight. Surrounding the building were 61 members of the South 
Carolina Militia, re-enforced with four machine guns, barring highway 
department employees and officials from entering the offices of the State 
Highway Commission. That morning, Governor Olin D. Johnston declared 
the Commission to be in a state of "rebellion, insurrection, resistence, and 
insurgency...and thus subject to control by the state militia." This order 
answered the specific questions. But there remained a question of a larger 
scope: For what reason had Governor Johnston declared the Commission 
insurgent and rebellious to a point which necessitated troops? 
The conflict between Olin Johnston and the State Highway Commission 
originated in 1929 when South Carolina was joining other southern states in 
the building of road networks to bolster a fast-sagging Southern economy. 
State law prohibited bonds for road projects, and the state was forced to 
finance highway construction by a method entitled "pay-as-you-go." 
Governor John C. Richards had supported a bill calling for a $65 million road 
bond issue.3 Although state law required that the bill be submitted to a 
popular referendum, since it involved the constitutional question of raising the 
state debt, the approved measure provided for no such vote. When its 
opponents tested its legality, the State Supreme Court ruled 3-2 that the 
measure was unconstitutional. The Constitution required that when 
constitutional questions were not unanimously settled by the Supreme Court, 
the circuit judges must be summoned. The enbanc court overruled the 
Supreme Court justices, calling the law a t ax, not a bond issue, and thus not 
requiring a popular referendum.4 
The chief opponents to the road bond measure were from the 
"up-country", a locality in which the roads were in much better condition 
than in other parts of the state. The leader of these bond foes was 
Representative Olin DeWitt Johnston of Spartanburg. Johnston argued that 
such a large increase in the state debt would cause the state to go bankrupt, 
and that his constituents were bei ng forced to pay an additional tax t o build 
"low-country" roads. He blamed the measure's success on the powerful 
influence exerted by the State Highway Commission and its chief 
commissioner, Benjamin M. Sawyer. Johnston continued the fight in h is 1930 
gubernatorial race, campaigning vigorously against the bond issue, being 
defeated by a mere 998 votes. Johnston, suspicious of Ibra C. Blackwood s 
large Charleston vote, requested a recount. The Democratic Executive 
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Committee found no evidence of fraud because the Charleston ballots had 
been mysteriously burned. Johnston, convinced of fraud, attributed his defeat 
to the influence of Ben Sawyer. In 1934, Johnston ran again for the 
governorship, stumping the state calling for a reorganization of tghe Highway 
Department and the removal of Sawyer.5 
On Tuesday, January 15, 1935, Olin DeWitt Johnston became the 
Governor of South Carolina. In his inaugural address, he reminded the 
citizens of the campaign issue of highway reorganization. Stating that his 
overwhelming victory had been a mandate of the people to change the 
department, he called for the immediate resignation of Ben Sawyer and the 
entire Highway Commission. The citizens, he said, had given the 
department ... its day in the court of public opinion." Calling the department 
"...a political octopus". Johnston accused the commission of building a 
gigantic political machine to gain control of the state and said that orderly 
reorganization would begin when the present commission resigned. Two days 
later, having received no resignations, he wrote each commissioner, asking for 
his resignation in obedience to the peoples' mandate. When neither letters, nor 
verbal demands, nor the rumor of state troops seemed to sway the 
commissioners from their adamant refusal to resign, Johnston turned to the 
legislature for highway reorganization. 6 
On January 25, 56 Johnston supporters in the House introduced a 
highway reorganization measure which called for a six-member commission, 
representing each congressional district, to be appointed by the governor. 
Johnston said that the bill would "eliminate the expansive control of the 
commission" and permit reorganization. The Governor's optimism quickly 
faded when the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the measure. 
Representative E. C. Lewis of Anderson had introduced an opposition 
reorganization which gave the legislative delegations the power of electing 14 
highway commissioners from their judicial circuits.7 The rival bills were 
debated in committee on the same day. No one spoke in favor of the Johnston 
bill yet eleven of the highway commissioners testfied against. The Committee 
gave an unfavorable report to Johnston's bill and a favorable recommendation 
to the Lewis measure.8 
Johnston warned that he might veto an important liquor bill if his 
measure did not get approval. On February 12, both bills were reported for 
debate with the Johnston bill calendared first. The next day, with the 
Governor present in the chamber, the House tied, 55-55, on a motion for 
passage. On a second motion, the House voted to continue the Johnston bill by 
a 56-54 vote. Johnston declared that the fight had just begun and vowed to 
seek a more favorable legislature in 1936.9 The Lewis bill was passed and sent 
to the Senate. In final form, it called for the legislative election of 14 
commissioners with removal power over the commissioners transferred from 
the governor to the individual legislative delegations.10 
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After the failure of the reorganization bill, Johnston moved to fulfill 
another campaign promise — the $3 auto license tag. Fighting through March 
and April against highway department lobbyists, Johnston gained final 
passage for the lower tag on April 24 and sent the measure to the Senate.11 
After this partial victory, the Governor prepared to fulfill still another pledge 
by seeking to remove Ben Sawyer. Johnston requested that the House 
Appropriations Committee itemize the state budget.12 The budget was passed 
by the Hou se and on May 14, Johnston vetoed Sawyer's salary, citing again 
the mandate of the people for Sawyer's removal. In a speech the following 
day, Johnston compared Sawyer to Huey Long and declared that he had 
ended "Sawyer-ism", a disease he considered worse than Long-ism.13 
As the legislative session neared its end, the Senate amended the $3 tag 
bill with the Lewis reorganization bill. The House concurred. On M ay 17, the 
measure was sent to Johnston but the Governor was not fooled. He vetoed the 
entire bill, calling it a "hybrid bill'' designed and politically manipulated to 
embarrass him as governor.14 The legislature made no attempt to override the 
veto. The Johnston opponents had succeeded in forcing Johnston to veto his 
own bill. Representative Solomon Blatt of Barnwell said the following about 
the maneuver: 
We made him veto his own bill.... We wanted to go 
back to the people and tell them that Johnston vetoed 
your $3 license tag. That was the reason that was done. 
That was a deliberate thing in which I took a very active 
part.... The purpose of it was to say to the people that 
Governor Johnston had promised you a $3 tag, we gave you 
the $3 tag and to show his lack of sincerity, he vetoed 
it....He came out for a $3 tag and we gave him the $3 tag 
and we provided that the (road) commissioners would be 
closer to the people by putting one in each judicial cir­
cuit. Rather than way away from you, we would put a man 
right in your midst to see that your area was protected. 
The Governor didn't want you to have that protection — 
he wanted to be a dictator and rule that department and 
rather than give you representation on there, he was even 
willing to go back on that promise that he made to give 
you a $3 tag and he vetoed it.... Your own governor 
vetoed that bill and denied you the right to have a $3 
license tag.15 
After adjournment, Johnston made no moves at reorganization, and Ben 
Sawyer continued to function as chief commissioner. On June 6, the Highway 
Commission held its first meeting since Sawyer's salary had been cut, after 
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which chairman C. 0. Hearon had "no comment" to questions by the press as 
to commission action on Sawyer's status. By August, Johnston became 
impatient that, despite his requests, he had seen no attempts by the 
commission either to remove Sawyer or to determine his status. On August 22, 
he informed the commission that he would hold up an $11 million road 
project by refusing to sign replacement bonds as long as Sawyer remained in 
office. Johnston said that he regarded the retention of Sawyer as a direct slap 
and remarked, "We will see whether Ben Sawyer is bigger than $11 million in 
the eyes of the State Highway Commission." The Commission replied by 
hiring Sawyer as chief commissioner with a salary of $4,400 and passing a 
resolution that road programs could be financed with county and regular state 
road bonds. 
In a radio message on September 4, Johnston declared three vacancies on 
the Commission and appointed three supporters — J. C. Long, L. C. 
Richardson, and W. L. Rhodes — with orders for them to assume office 
immediately. The Governor based his action on an opinion received from 
State Attorney General John M. Daniel that terms of four commissioners had 
expired on April 1 5, 1935 under a statute which required commissioners to 
run continuously for four years each without staying in office until a successor 
was qualified.18 Ousted Commissioner W. F. Lightsey said that he would 
remain in office until otherwise ordered by the courts or the legislature. The 
old commission continued to function and the Johnston appointees were 
ignored, despite a warning by the Governor that he would use his 
constitutional power to call in the militia in a state of emergency unless his 
men were seated on the commission.19 Despite this threat, the commission 
continued to operate. On October 9, the Commission, after meeting with the 
Governor, met and refused to seat the Johnston appointees. Commissioner 
George Bell Timmerman stated that since the new men lacked Senate 
confirmation, they were not legal appointees. The commission said it would 
not oust the incumbents until so ordered by the courts.20 
Johnston waited for the state courts to take some action in this direction 
but when none appeared forthcoming, he issued an executive order calling for 
Chairman C. O. Hearon, and Commissioners E. L. Culler and John C. Bethea 
to appear before him on October 23 and show cause why they should not be 
ousted from office. The order contained a list of ten charges, including 
illegally paying Sawyer's salary without authority and in defiance of state law. 
Other allegations included refusing to seat Johnston's appointees and illegal 
oil bids, truck renta ls, and gasoline purchases. 
The hearings began in the Governor's office on October 23. As their 
reason for not seating the Johnston men, the commissioners accused the 
Governor of trying to control the commission by appointing men who would 
act in accordance with his views, and cited a statute requiring Senate 
confirmation for gubernatorial appointees. As to charges concerning Sawyer, 
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they said that they understood that they had the statuatory right to decide 
Sawyer's salary and if the action had been illegal, then the state treasurer 
would n ot have paid the vouchers. Next day, Johnston's attempts to show 
crooked dealings by the commissioners was squashed by testimony of 
Spartanburg accountant Joe Calus, who testified that in a uditing the highway 
department books, he found only 4 of the 1700 accounts in error and these 
errors had been in the state's favor. On October 25, Commissioner Bethea told 
of an effort by Johnston to force himself, along with Culler and E. S. Booth to 
support the Governor and his appointees or face removal from office. 
With this disclosure, the hearings were adjourned. Another problem 
arose on October 26 when Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Stabler, on 
petition from the Commission, signed an order for Johnston's appointees to 
appear in court to show cause why they should be allowed to take office, and 
issued a temporary restraining order against them until the completion of such 
hearings.23 Johnston was faced with a dilemma. His appointees had been 
restrained by the courts, they were facing show cause hearings, and he 
personally had been accused of questionable dealings in hearings he had 
called ag ainst the commission. 
Before dawn on Monday, October 28, the Governor, by executive 
proclamation, ordered 61 National Guardsmen to the State Office Building 
with orders to take over the Highway Commission Offices, and ordered 
Sawyer, the Commissioners, and all department employees to vacate all 
department property. Since Johnston was not going to be allowed by the 
courts or the legislature to reorganize the department his own way, he would 
have to use the militia. The Governor explained his startling action later that 
morning in "An Address to the Citizens of South Carolina." The force had 
been necessary, he said, to remove Sawyer and the Commission since they 
had"... set up a supreme government answerable neither to the people, the 
legislature, the Attorney General, or the Governor."24 Announcing that he was 
taking charge of the department to end "... trickery and subterfuge, favoritism 
and irregularities," the Governor referred to his unanswered inaugural 
demand for resignations, the legislative defeat, the refusal to seat appointees, 
and the removal proceedings testimony as the reasons which convinced him 
that only mobilization of troops would compel them to obey the will of the 
people after all else had failed.25 Later that day, the Governor, in another 
executive order, set up the new administrative organization of the department, 
calling for an executive manager and five consulting managers who would 
have full supervision over roads, machinery, and records. In letters to State 
Treasurer E . P. Miller and State Comptroller A. J. Beattie, the Governor 
ordered th e department funds under the authorizing signature of Joe Calus, 
new executive manager.27 In meeting the press later, Johnston and Calus^ 
announced that all 2000 department employees were being asked to resign. 
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Reaction to the military coup was varied. Sawyer and the commissioners 
could not be reached for comment with the exception of Timmerman who said 
that the people would have to choose between a rebellious dictator or a regular 
governor.29 From Johnston appointee J. C. Long came the remark that the 
Governor's actions were in the interest of good government and the people.30 
The Charleston News & Courier ran an editorial calling the action pitiful, 
comical, childish, and dangerous.31 
The next day, Johnston made further moves to secure his control on the 
commission by dispatching Major Frank Barnwell and a squadron of 
occupation troops to three Columbia banks to confiscate highway department 
funds on deposit.32 The troops entered the South Carolina National, the 
Citizens and Southern, and the Lower Main Street banks, all which had 
halted payment of funds the previous day, and by mid-morning had seized 
$1,871,352 in deposited funds. Calus announced that 75% of the resignations 
were in, explaining that they were only a precautionary measure against 
disloyalty and that each employee would be rehired as his loyalty was 
determined. With funds now under control of the new board, the resignations 
coming in, and the ousted men making no attempt to gain their offices, it 
appeared that Johnston had gained full control of the department.33 
The road board hit its first legal snag on October 29 when Comptroller A. 
J. Beattie announced that he had been advised by t he Attorney General that 
since the Governor had not ordered funds paid in his proclamation, then the 
new board had no valid claim to them. Beattie refused to pay requests signed 
by C alus saying that he lacked the authority, adding that since the state of 
emergency suspended his control over the finances, the military troops should 
handle the money.34 
During all this controversy, the ousted commissioners were working to 
get back into office. On October 30, they filed a petition in Supreme Court 
seeking their reinstatement. A process server was dispatched with an order 
freezing all funds and calling for hearings before the Chief Justice at which the 
Calus board should show cause why they should not be removed from office. 
The process server, James G. Dreker, arrived at the Office Building that 
afternoon. Calus summoned Major Barnwell and instructed him to remove 
Dreker from the building. Dreker threw a copy of the court order on the desk 
and after having it given back to him, threw it on the floor. It was stuffed back 
into his pocket as he was ejected from the building by two troopers. Dreker 
returned to the courthouse, declaring that the order had been legally and 
properly served. Attaches in the Governor's office later announced that 
Johnston did not consider the order legally served because Calus had not 
touched it. In response to the court order, Johnston said that funds would be 
found, despite the freeze, and that he had no intention of returning 
department control to its former managers.35 
The first week of military-backed control of the highway department 
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drew to a close with the problem of money still in the spotlight. From 
Washington, Public Roads Bureau Chief Thomas H. MacDonald announced 
that federal road funds were being withheld until the legality of the Johnston 
board could be determined. In Charleston, U. S. Postmaster E. C. Goza 
suspended payment on all postal money orders addressed to the Commission 
or to Calus to prevent local license inspectors from sending desperately needed 
funds to Columbia. Added to this was the fact that Calus was a day late in 
meeting the department payroll.36 
The second major problem was the legal one. There had been no more 
attempts by the courts to serve any orders but Johnston, taking no chances, 
had all six commissioners escorted by militia and ordered guards to obtain 
purpose-of-business statements from anyone entering the building. Calus 
learned that the court order which he had refused had been legally served and 
he ordered commission lawyers to prepare briefs for the hearing. The 
attorneys argued that the board members were volunteers in the state militia 
called to active duty by the Governor. As a military board, they were not 
subject to any civil jurisdiction until the state of emergency was lifted.38 On 
November 11, the hearings opened with Justice Stabler presiding. Arguments 
were exchanged as attorneys for the ousted men stated that the Governor had 
usurped the authority of the legislature and the courts when he forcefully took 
charge of the department, while Johnston's lawyers replied that the Governor 
had acted for the people. The hearings ended that same day with the verdict 
not expected before December.39 
With the legal proceedings temporarily concluded, the commission 
attempted to accomplish some work. Things seemed to function normally as 
Calus called for bids for further road construction. On November 13, the 
Supreme Court released sufficient funds to meet department obligations 
through January 1. This order put the financial woes of the department at an 
end as it authorized funds to meet payrolls and to reimburse road bonds and 
their interest payments. State Treasurer E. P. Miller, however, refused to pay 
deposited federal funds for state-federal projects arguing that the court order 
had relea sed only state money and that federal funds were still frozen.4 
Up to this time, none of the reorganization which Johnston had promised 
had occurred. He had removed the old commissioners but he had made no 
further changes. On November 23, the first signs of some reorganization 
began as Calus fired three veteran employees, and two days later, eight more. 
Many employees feared that a kind of purge was being carried ou t. 
On December 5, the Supreme Court unanimously declared Johnston s 
seizure of the Commission unconstitutional, holding that a state ol 
insurrection had not really existed. The 13 ousted commissioners were left in 
undisputed control of the department as they were returned to their jobs and 
the Johnston appointees were permanently restrained from the offices. W ithin 
an hour after the ruling, Johnston again mobilized the National Guard. 1 he 
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Calus board left the offices following the court s announcement, and Johnston 
moved in troops under Major Barnwell, giving him complete control of the 
department.42 Johnston did not stop with this military action. He had withheld 
his verdict on the show cause hearings until, on December 6, he removed 
Chairman Hearon and the two other commissioners for illegally paying 
Sawyer and refusing to seat his appointees.43 On December 7, he suspended 
Ben Sawyer and the ten remaining commissioners and ordered them to show 
cause on December 13 why they should not be permanently removed. The 
commissioners were charged with the same violations as the other men, and 
Sawyer was charged with accepting a salary in violation of th e law. Johnston 
next called for the state legislature to convene in special session on December 
10 to enact legislation calling for popular election of the Highway 
Commission. He had to implement some sort of reorganization in order to 
fulfill his campaign promises. There were 2400 employees working under a 
National Guard major who knew nothing about the department. With both 
federal and state funds frozen after the new military coup, mass 
unemployment remained a live possibility. 
Johnston was certain to face problems with the legislature. He still had a 
large number of legi slators opposed to highway reorganization, in addition to 
the fact that his image had been clouded by the October 28 coup and his 
defiance of the Supreme Court. As the lawmakers arrived in Columbia, early 
discussion centered around a proposal that the two houses should refrain from 
considering reorganization measures until all troops were removed.45 
On Tuesday, December 10, the State Legislature was gaveled into special 
session. Johnston stated that he had no desire to be a dictator and had only 
used the militia to smash a "domineering political ring." The Governor s 
denial just aroused'tempers more. Following the announcement that troops 
would remain until temporary reorganization laws were passed, Senator 
Harry Hughs asked his colleagues to approve legislation compelling the 
Governor to remove the troops. On December 12, the Senate passed a 
resolution, 39-3, stating that no legislation would be passed until troops were 
removed. It backed up its demand by refusing to consider confirmation of 
commission appointees submitted by Johnston to fill the vacancies left by 
Hearon, Culler, and Bethea. The House approved a similar measure, 108-3, 
requesting the Governor to comply with the court by returning control to the 
old commission and by pulling out troops.46 
Johnston retained the troops and criticized the legislature for inactivity. 
He said that the state of emergency still existed and that the troops would 
remain until the rights of the people were preserved.47 The stalemate 
continued. Johnston refused to budge and legislators advocating troop 
removal managed to bottle up reorganization measures in committee. On 
December 18, Representative Lewis reintroduced his bill, calling for 
legislative election of the commission and popular election of the chief. He 
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hoped that the popular election clause would appease the Governor. In a 
further attempt to gain some action several legis lators formed a committee to 
meet with the Governor in an at tempt to reach a compromise. The committee 
met with Johnston on December 19 and 20. The discussion was long and 
heated, and several times the success of the meeting was threatened by a 
walk-out. The Governor wanted a neutral road board to take over until 
permanent legislation could be enacted. The legislators remained firm in their 
contention that the first step must be the removal of troops. The Governor 
warned that he wanted to see legislation first, declaring that he would keep the 
troops forever and would even close the department. Finally, after much 
discussion, it was decided that Johnston would withdraw the troops and the 
legislature would establish a temporary road board for a 60-day term and to 
be headed by impartial p eople until the courts and the legislature could act on 
the issue permanently. Johnston was satisfied and the legislators returned to 
get the legislation approved.49 
The final draft of the measure provided for a temporary commission to be 
headed by Treasurer Miller, Comptroller Beattie, and Sinking Fund 
Chairman F. C. Robinson, with management vested with Chief Highway 
Fngineer J. S. Williamson. The Department was authorized to draw on funds 
from the stat e treasury to pay department debts until the freeze on funds was 
lifted. Johnston withdrew troops on December 20, and on the next day, signed 
the b ill. At the same time, he announced that a petition had been filed in 
Supreme Court to release state highway funds, and that federal officials in 
Washington had released federal funds to the state. With this 
accomplishment, the legislature adjourned, planning to return in January to 
settle the matter permanently.50 
The reorganization battle of 1936 began quickly. On January 3, the 
circuit courts heard an appeal from Hearon, Culler, and Bethea that they be 
reinstated. Their argument was that Johnston had ousted them as a result of 
court rulings against him and his military regime. Johnston s lawyers argued 
that the men had been found guilty in legally executed hearings of violating 
state law.51 On January 10, Chief Judge C. E. Dennis handed down the first of 
the decisions as he found John C. Bethea innocent of all ten misconduct 
charges levied by Johnston, and ordered Bethea restored to office. The 
following day, C. O. Hearon and E. L. Culler were likewise cleared of all 
allegations and reinstated. Johnston had no comment but as he began show 
cause hearings for Sawyer and the ten remaining commissioners on January 
16, he added additional charges to the initial list bringing the total to 28, and 
including such charges as influencing legislators and publishing a propaganda 
magazine.52 
The regular session of the legislature convened on January 14. Johnston, 
in his "S tate of the State" address, hardly mentioned reorganization but the 
legislature knew it would face the issue. On the first full day of business, 
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Representative Arrowsmith introduced a reorganization measure similar to 
the old Lewis bill, calling for the present commissioners to take control until 
their terms expired, at which time their successors, including the chief 
commissioner would be elected by legislative delegations.53 But action was 
stalled by a group advocating holding action on reorganization measures 
pending the outcome of the new show cause hearings. The Governor, in the 
meantime, had postponed the hearings indefinitely.54 
There was one man who was tired of all the stalemates. Ben Sawyer, 
ousted Chief Commissioner, had been subjected to all levels of political 
inconvenience. His salary had been vetoed, he had been prohibited from 
entering his office, and he had been suspended and ordered to show cause 
before his political enemy why he should not be fired. With the announcement 
of postponement of the hearings. Sawyer, on January 18, petitioned the circuit 
courts to halt ouster proceedings against him and restore him to office. Circuit 
Judge G. D. Bellinger ordered Johns ton to appear and show cause why his 
suspension of Sawyer was valid and why his removal attempts should not be 
restrained.55 
Stalemate still reigned in the legislature where the Arrowsmith bill was 
stalled in committee. In February, however, the legislature came to life. On 
February 7, the Judiciary Committee announced that the old Lewis 
Arrowsmith bill, now titled the Blatt Poag-Johnson Bill, was soon to be 
reported to the House. On February 10, a bill was introduced calling for road 
bonds to be issued without the governor's signature. 
On February 11, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported the 
Blatt-Poag-Johnson Bill, worded so not to take effect until litigation over 
removal of the present commission was concluded. This enabled the 
legislature to maintain its stand against legislating the commission out of 
office before completion of removal hearings, and gave the legislature the time 
and machinery to reorganize the department as it m ost desired.57 
The bill had hardly been reported when the Johnston cause suffered 
another setback. On February 14, Ben Sawyer was reinstated. Judge 
Bellinger declared Johnston's ouster of Sawyer null and void, dismissed 
removal proceedings against him, and permanently enjoined Johnston from 
further attempts to oust the chief. Governor Johnston's only comment was 
that he would appeal the ruling. 
The legislature was pleased. When the two houses met on February 19, 
there was no action to set up a new road board to replace the temporary board 
expiring February 20 as the legislators were waiting to see if Sawyer would 
come to work and save them the trouble of having to organize a new 
administration. On t he 20th, Sawyer returned to his office for the first time 
since October 28, stating that it was his legal right and duty to take over and 
keep things running. Johnston responded declaring that Sawyer was not 
entitled to office until the appeal was settled. Sawyer stayed on, despite 
attempts by Johnston supporters in the legislature to oust him.59 
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On February 21, the House voted 48-25 to pass the amended 
Blatt-Poag-Johnson bill and sent it to the Senate. When the bill reached the 
Senate, there were some more changes which the House refused to accept. The 
bill was sent to conference committee.61 
During this time, Johnston suffered two more defeats. On March 1, the 
Supreme Court turned down his appeal on the Sawyer decision. The second 
defeat came on March 9 when Johnston was ordered to appear in Supreme 
Court and show cause why his suspension of the ten commissioners should not 
be lifted. The men argued that they had been given no hearing to justify their 
suspension.62 
On April 10, the legislative conference committee reported a compromise 
measure which gave election of the commission to the legislature and its 
removal to the circuit courts. It called for 14 commissioners to be elected as 
soon as practical for four year staggered terms. The bill seemed to appease all 
factions but it was feared that Johnston would veto the measure as it took^ 
away his removal power and called for legislative rather than popular election. 
On April 13, Johnston lost the last of his court battles as the Supreme 
Court ruled unanimously that his removal of the ten commissioners was null 
and void. The commissioners were cleared of all charges and reinstated. The 
decision virtually closed the case of Johnston v. the Highway Department 
with the Governor overruled in all attempts to remove the incumbent 
commission. His only hope remained some type of legislative reorganization in 
his favor. But even here, he faced problems. The terms of eight commissioners 
expired on April 15, 1936. Johnston had appointed men to take these 
vacancies and if they were confir med, he would have a majority of sup port on 
the board. But the Senate balked at confirmation, awaiting the outcome of the 
reorganization measure. Johnston opposed the bill because it provided for 
none of the restructuring ideas which he favored. 
Governor Johnston began his last-ditch offense on April 2 1 when he 
vetoed a road construction bill which permitted bond issues and payment of 
road expenditures upon concurrent legislative resolution.^He stated that the 
bill denied him his constitutional power to sign bonds. On April 22, the 
legislature approved the conference reorganization bill. Johnston vetoed it 
calling it a confirmation of the old commission structure. He said that this bill 
denied him of his removal and appointive powers and argued that an 
appointed circuit judge should not have the power of removal denied an 
elected governor.67 On April 29, Johnston won a hollow victory when the 
Senate failed to override his veto. But in the House, the representatives voted 
to override and then immediately voted to reconsider their action. 
On May 1, Senator Harry Hughs delivered one of the most vehement 
attacks ever levied against the Governor. Johnston, he said, had started the 
highway issue to keep his own "political pot boiling. Calling Johnston a 
promise-breaker, he cited the reorganization veto as a change in principle 
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from 1929 when Johnston co-authored a bill calling for legislative election of 
the commission. Hughs said that Johnston s idea of reorganization was merely 
new personnel in an old organization.69 
Johnston did not allow this attack to go unanswered. On May 2, he made 
an appeasing move by announcing that he would sign bonds for funds if the 
Senate would confirm his road appointees.70 House members who had been 
working for a new compromise bill approached Johnston with two 
alternatives: They would write a reorganization incorporating most of his 
ideas or they would legislatively elect a completely new board. Johnston 
spurned these ideas.71 
With the failure of the House to reach a compromise, the Senate decided 
to try. On May 7, it passed and sent to the House a reorganization bill which 
combined road bonds, reorganization, and a lower auto tag. The House 
approved and sent the measure to Johnston where it received a quick veto. 
The bill, he said, had not received the required three readings needed for 
passage .72  
When the legislators sent the Triple Road Bill to the Governor, they 
expected him to veto it. But the authors hoped they could override this latest 
veto. On May 13, the first vote in the House failed to override by 3 votes, but 
again the legislators voted to reconsider their action. On May 14, the House 
and the Senate both overrode the veto making the Triple Road Act law. The 
bill called for the election of 14 commissioners by the legislative delegations of 
the 14 judicial circuits with the chief com missioner to be elected by the board 
members, and for removal of the commission only by the circuit courts. The 
price of auto tags was lowered and the power to sign road bonds was 
transferred from t he governor to the state treasurer.74 
With this action, the legislature accomplished what it had failed to do on 
two previous occasions. The highway department and the commission had 
been reorganized and the governor had been defeated in a struggle which had 
lasted for 17 months. There seemed to be little that Johnston could do without 
defying the courts and the legislature and it was doubted that Johnston would 
make any more a ttempts to control the department. 
What were Olin Johnston's motives for such a violent campaign against 
the State Highway Commission? Was it for personal spite against Sawyer or 
did he actually believe that the department was a corrupt political ring? Did 
he really want reorganization? Did he believe that he had received a mandate 
from the people? Were his removal methods legal? 
None of these questions can really be answered. It is apparent that 
Johnston had a personal motive against the department and especially Ben 
Sawyer. He blamed Sawyer for his defeat in the 1930 gubernatorial race. 
Johnston had to get rid of Sawyer because he was so powerful in the state, not 
because he was a corrupt political official. Attempts to show Sawyer as a crook 
proved futile. But Ben Sawyer was probably the most powerful man in the 
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state. He controlled an enormous number of votes and a lot of patronage 
power. Olin Johnston saw Sawyer as a political enemy, a man whose influence 
was so strong, powerful, and widespread that he could determine the success 
or failure of Johnston and his political career. His feeling about the 
commission itself was very similar. Johnston held no personal grudge against 
the com missioners, yet he saw them, like Sawyer, as a powerful influential 
body that c ould hamper any political ambitions that he might have. Because 
of this, Johnston decided that reorganization of the department was necessary. 
But it also appears that Johnston really wanted complete control of the 
department, that his objective was not reorganization but replacement with 
his supporters who would run the department his way. The court and 
legislative battles suggest that his concern was his power to appoint and 
remove commissioners so that he would have complete control. Johnston saw 
the commission as a political obstacle. With his own men on the board, the 
commission could become a valuable political tool. Johnston's main problem 
was that he had no grounds on which to remove men and appoint his own 
supporters. The commission was efficient, and Sawyer was a professional at 
road de partment administration. Even Johnston's hand-picked accountant 
could fin d no evidence of financial misconduct in the department. 
As for the peoples' mandate, Johnston used the phrase frequently to 
enforce his actions. Johnston did have a great deal of support. He had been 
campaigning against road bonds and the road commission since 1929 and he 
was able to convince the people that road bonds were wrong and that Sawyer 
and the highway commission were a bunch of crooks running a political 
machine. But basically, Johnston used the phrase of a mandate so much that 
it became a convenient screen to justify all of his questionable activities. The 
legality of Johnston's actions appears shakey. It took several defeats in court 
for Johnston to be checkmated. 
Was Olin Johnston trying to become a South Carolina Huey Long? That 
is open to speculation. Johnston apparently wanted complete control of the 
state and realized that he would have to get rid of the highway commission 
because of its powerful political influence. But where Long succeeded, 
Johnston failed. He did not have the wide range of political support, either in 
the legislature, on the local level, or on the court benches. Johnston had no 
effective political organization of any kind with which to combat the efficient 
organization of his opponents in the legislature or to undercut the influence of 
Sawyer and the Commission. Johnston did not have the support to play the 
game of demagogic pressure pol itics. 
It was not until after the crisis had ended that the danger of the whole 
incident was realized. A state governor had manipulated the laws of the state 
and used the militia to purge the government of a personal political obstacle. 
The incident is a classic example of the executive branch attempting to thwart 
the authority of the legislative and judicial branches and thus upset the 
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American system of separation of powers. The 17-month struggle between 
Olin Johnston and the State Highway Commission will long remain an 
important chapter in South Carolina's history. Only because of the 
determination and strength of the legislature and the courts was Olin DeWitt 
Johnston forced to relinquish his fight against Ben Sawyer and the State 
Highway Commission. 
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